I think the most natural thing in this country that you would probably hear from a colleague who is a journalist would be that for some reason, the same problem comes to the agenda at various times and is discussed extensively, but what needs to be done is not done; therefore, the same issue is discussed over and over again within the same setting. The issue of transition to a professional army as required by the modern national security needs of Turkey is one of the leading discussions that come to the agenda over and over again.
In a statement he made on Wednesday, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the preliminary work on paid military service is nearing an end and that they will wrap this matter up next week and take steps right away. In parallel to this, under the principles of the Council of Europe, a study on a possible regulation pertinent to conscientious objectors is also being carried out. However, neither paid military service nor the conscientious objection study is about the gist of the issue.
The gist of the issue is the need to abandon general compulsory military service that is a fundamental tool of the military guardianship system that indoctrinates all males with militarist-Kemalist ideology; in other words, it is an opportunity for the military to take them on line in accordance with a militarist approach. On the other hand, the needs of modern national security, as well as the need for possessing armed forces whose only job would be protection of the territorial security and the need for becoming a contemporary civilian democracy require the introduction of a fully professional army without delay.
It is pretty obvious modern warfare techniques that use fully electronic and computerized arms, military equipment and arsenal have made conventional mass armies obsolete. In this way, it has become impossible for ordinary citizens to reach a level of competence and knowledge through short-term training to adequately meet modern security needs. While there are many examples of the superiority of professional armies over conventional armies even in the history, there is no logical or reasonable explanation for the insistence on massive armies today. Even a brief look at the history of the Ottoman state will reveal that its striking victories were won at times when it possessed a professional army, whereas it was mostly defeated in times when it utilized conventional massive armies.
Army size constitutes the biggest difference between a professional army and a mass army. However, a large army in terms of the number of troops does not mean it is a strong and powerful army. The power of nations is not measured by population size or the number of soldiers. Therefore, with 700,000 soldiers, it is not possible to assess or measure the real deterrence and warfare ability of the Turkish army. Testing the real power of our army, God forbids, is only possible in a war. There is no guarantee that such a lethal test, an undesirable possibility for which an army exists, will be won by the present army. However, it seems possible to make an analogy or reasoning by looking at the warfare capacity and capability of the Iraqi army, based on a similar system, vis-à-vis such a test. In other words, the defeat of the over 1 million-member Saddam Hussein army by US-led coalition forces, which were outnumbered by the Iraqis and deployed and commanded thousands of miles from the battlefield, standing out as a bitter experience that lessons should be drawn from.
Large armies are not necessarily strong armies; and unlike the commonly held perception, they are more expensive to maintain when compared to professional armies. The efficiency of the Turkish army, a large one, may be disputable; but I think all would agree that it is too expensive to keep. According to 2008 figures, 5.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) ($20 billion) was reserved for the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), which still receives the same amount; it is not possible to argue that it is the most economical army in the world, considering its relatively limited power and ability to strike. Besides, the number of paid staff in the TSK, including military officers, noncommissioned officers and experts, is equal to the total number of staff in the professional army of Britain, which has been involved over the last three decades in major battles and wars in Argentina, the Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq, while dysfunctional and clumsy large armies require armed or unarmed command lines and bureaucracy, which must include hundreds of thousands of personnel to meet command, administrative, logistical and health needs.
Somebody has to frankly answer the question as to why Turkey possesses and operates a sizeable and expensive army of 700,000, whereas Britain has 186,000, Italy 180,000, Spain 129,000, France 217,000, Germany 188,000 and Poland 134,000, all of which display similar characteristics in terms of population size and area. Is not the answer to this question nothing but the country’s national defense needs and requirements? For instance, doesn’t the existence of such a sizeable army create large scale power opportunities whose dimensions are uncertain? Doesn’t the idea of downsizing the army and converting into a professional one meet strong resistance by circles and groups within the army that use the status, influence and economic opportunities offered by the presence of a large army or the circles that cooperate with the army? Personally, I think based solely on these reasons that there is no possibility that the TSK has the ability to reform itself into a dynamic and strong professional army that can respond to current requirements.
For this reason, I believe that it is the task and duty as well as the responsibility of civilians to move to a professional army by radically changing the current military structure, which has become a huge liability rather than an asset for Turkey. Since a large army gives generals great advantages and opportunities for internal power and rule for themselves, I think it is impossible for the same generals -- who benefit from these advantages -- to do anything to reform that army. If you ask whether civilians are competent and knowledgeable enough to ensure a transition to a professional army, unfortunately, my answer to this question will be a clear no because sadly, there are only a handful of civilians specialized in military and security affairs. In this country, it is clear that a nation that has left all security policies to its army will be unsuccessful in attaining authentic democracy. And for this reason, there is no single institute in universities where you can carry out graduate or doctoral studies in the field of national security. I hope civilians, relevant institutions and, most importantly, universities will appreciate and understand the urgency that military servicemen are reluctant to address because of an obvious conflict of interest before it is too late.
